

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HUMBOLDT BAYKEEPER and  
ECOLOGICAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION,

No. C 06-02560 JSW

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY  
and NORTH COAST RAILROAD  
AUTHORITY,

**ORDER DENYING  
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR  
LEAVE TO AMEND**

Defendants.  
\_\_\_\_\_ /

Now before the Court is Defendants' motion for leave to amend their answer. Having considered the parties' papers, relevant legal authority, the record in this case, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court hereby denies Defendants' motion.<sup>1</sup>

**BACKGROUND**

Defendants move to amend their answer to change their admission that CUE VI owns the Balloon Track and to plead an affirmative defense of failure to join all necessary and indispensable parties. In essence, Defendants now seek to amend their answer to allege that the State may own part of the property. Plaintiffs oppose on the grounds that they would be prejudiced by the belated amendment, Defendants unduly delayed in seeking leave to amend, Defendants are moving in bad faith, and that the requested amendment would be futile.

<sup>1</sup> The Court HEREBY DENIES Plaintiffs' administrative motion for leave to file a sur-reply and GRANTS Plaintiffs' administrative motion for leave to file supplementary materials.

1 In their reply brief, Defendants argued that because parties may raise this indispensable  
2 party issue at any time, their delay cannot constitute “undue” delay and Plaintiffs would not be  
3 prejudiced by the proposed amendment. (Reply at 2-3, 5.) However, at the hearing on  
4 Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs responded that pursuant to the *Ex Parte Young* doctrine, the State  
5 may be sued for violations of federal law in which the plaintiffs merely seek prospective,  
6 injunctive relief, and therefore, the State would be, at most, a necessary party to this action, but  
7 would not be indispensable. Moreover, although the absence of an indispensable party may be  
8 raised at any time, the failure to join necessary parties may be waived if objections are not made  
9 in the defendant’s first responsive pleading. The Court provided Defendants an opportunity to  
10 respond to Plaintiffs’ argument raised oral argument.

#### 11 ANALYSIS

12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) (“Rule 15(a)”) permits a party to amend its  
13 pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Once a  
14 responsive pleading has been served, however, amendment requires written consent of the  
15 adverse party or leave of the court. In accordance with the Federal Rule’s liberal pleading  
16 standard, leave of the court “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.  
17 15(a). Though the decision to grant or deny a motion for leave to amend is governed by the  
18 district court’s discretion, the general rule is that amendment of the pleadings is to be permitted  
19 unless the opposing party makes a showing of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing  
20 side, or futility of amendment. *See Forman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); *DCD*  
21 *Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton*, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1986).

22 As noted above, Plaintiffs countered Defendants’ argument that because parties may  
23 raise the indispensable party issue at any time, their delay could not constitute undue delay and  
24 Plaintiffs would not be prejudiced by the proposed amendment. Plaintiffs asserted that pursuant  
25 to the *Ex parte Young* doctrine, the State may be sued for violations of federal law in which the  
26 plaintiffs merely seek prospective, injunctive relief, and therefore, the State would be, at most, a  
27 necessary party to this action, but would not be indispensable. Moreover, although the absence  
28 of an indispensable party may be raised at any time, the failure to join necessary parties may be

1 waived if objections are not made in the defendant's first responsive pleading. *See Citibank,*  
2 *N.A. v. Oxford Properties & Finance Ltd.*, 688 F.2d 1259, 1263 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1982).

3 The Court finds Defendants' response to the issues of waiver and whether the State  
4 would be indispensable unpersuasive. Defendants' reliance on *Phillippines v. Pimentel*, \_\_ U.S.  
5 \_\_, 128 S.Ct. 2180 (2008) is misplaced. In *Phillippines*, the parties did not contest whether the  
6 Republic of the Philippines ("Republic") and the Philippine Presidential Commission on Good  
7 Governance ("Commission") were necessary parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  
8 19(a). *Id.* at 2189. The issue before the Court was whether the Republic and the Commission  
9 were indispensable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 19(b).

10 Again, the Court finds Defendants' reliance on its cited authority for the proposition that  
11 the State cannot be joined, and is thus indispensable pursuant to Rule 19(b), is misplaced.  
12 Pursuant to the *Ex Parte Young* doctrine, the State may be sued for violations of federal law in  
13 which the plaintiffs merely seek prospective, injunctive relief. *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123,  
14 159-160 (1908). In the case relied on by Defendants, the Supreme Court held that although an  
15 allegation of an on-going violation of federal law where the requested relief is prospective is  
16 ordinarily sufficient to invoke the *Ex parte Young* doctrine, the case before it was "unusual in  
17 that the Tribe's suit [was] the functional equivalent of a quiet title action" and sought  
18 "substantially all benefits of ownership and control" over the property. *Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene*,  
19 521 U.S. 261, 281-282 (1997). As a result, the Court held that the *Ex Parte Young* doctrine was  
20 inapplicable. *Id.* In contrast, Plaintiffs' action here is not the equivalent of a quiet title action.  
21 Therefore, *Coeur d'Alene* is inapposite.

22 Finally, Defendants unpersuasively argue that the issue of whether the State is a  
23 necessary party cannot be waived. Defendants argue that the language of Rule 19(a) does not  
24 impose any obligation on the parties to protect the interests of absent persons, but instead, is  
25 directed at the courts. However, Defendants ignore the plain language of Federal Rule of Civil  
26 Procedure 12 and the case law holding that the affirmative defense of failure to join necessary  
27 parties may be waived if objections are not made in the first responsive pleading. Rule 12(b)  
28 provides that every defense, including the failure to join a party under Rule 19, must be asserted

in the responsive pleading if one is required. Rule 12(h)(2) merely exempts the failure to join a person required under Rule 19(b) from waiver, not necessary parties under Rule 19(a). *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (h); *see also Ransom v. Babbitt*, 69 F. Supp. 2d 141, 148 (D.D.C. 1999) (“The timeliness requirements of Rule 12(h) counsel that ‘[i]n federal procedure, failure to join necessary parties is waived if objection is not made in defendant’s first responsive pleading; it is only the absence of an indispensable party which may (possibly) be raised later.’”) (quoting *Citibank*, 688 F.2d at 1263 n. 4). Courts have clearly found that although the absence of an indispensable party may be raised at any time, the failure to join necessary parties may be waived if objections are not made in the defendant’s first responsive pleading. *See Citibank*, 688 F.2d at 1263 n. 4;<sup>2</sup> *see also Manning v. Energy Conversion Devices, Inc.*, 13 F.3d 606, 609 (2d Cir. 1994); *State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co.*, 518 F.2d 292, 294 (10th Cir. 1975); *Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Save-a-Buck Car Rental Co., Inc.*, 201 F.R.D. 440, 440-441 (W.D. Mich. 2000); *Ransom*, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 148; *UTI Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.*, 896 F. Supp. 389, 391 (D.N.J. 1995) (“the defense of failure to join necessary parties is waived if not pleaded”); *North Dixie Theatre, Inc. v. McCullion*, 613 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (“Although Rule 12(h)(2) preserves an *indispensible* party objection, this provision does not apply to persons who are merely necessary parties under Rule 19(a)”) (emphasis in original).

The court in *CP National Corp. v. Bonneville Power Admin.*, 928 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1991) simply provides that *courts* may raise the absence of necessary parties *sua sponte* and may do so at any stage in the proceeding. *Id.* at 911-12. The court did not consider whether a party could raise the issue at any stage in the proceeding or whether this defense could be waived, and did not address the requirements of Rule 12.

Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants have waived the issue of whether the State is a necessary party. The Court further finds that Defendants unduly delayed in raising this issue

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<sup>2</sup> Defendants argue that *Citibank* is inconsistent with *Phillippines*, but, as noted above, in *Phillippines*, the parties did not contest whether the Republic and the Commission were necessary parties under Rule 19(a). Instead the issue before the Court was whether the Republic and the Commission were indispensable under Rule 19(b). *Phillippines*, 128 S.Ct. at 2189.

1 and that Plaintiffs would be prejudiced if Defendants were allowed to amend at this late stage in  
2 the proceedings. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion for leave to amend.

3 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

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5 Dated: June 1, 2009

  
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JEFFREY S. WHITE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE